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AUTHOR:

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TITLE:

THE GROUNDS OF
NON-CATHOLIC...

PLACE:

CHICAGO

DATE:

1905

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Smith, Arthur Maxson.

The grounds of non-Catholic freedom in the
Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas... Chicago,
1905.

38 p. 24cm.

Thesis (Ph. D.) Chicago.

Bibliography: p. 37-38.

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
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


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
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

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
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The
Grounds of Non-Catholic Freedom
in the Summa Theologiae
of Thomas Aquinas

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY
SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY)

By ARTHUR MAXSON SMITH

CHICAGO
R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY
1905

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INTRODUCTION.

THE MODERN INDIVIDUAL.

The extreme philosophical expression of modern individualism is given in complete form in the Hegelian idea of free logical activity containing a moment of progress. Prior to Kant, consciousness was viewed as generically disparate from ultimate reality. The real was the objective. Consciousness was simply the sum of psychic experiences involved in the life process, and had no generic connection whatever with that which was conceived as ultimately real. The problem for philosophy as well as for religion, in ancient and mediæval times, was: How can the individual, conceived from this point of view, overcome the fixed, generic dualism between consciousness as such, and the world of ultimate truth and reality?

The Kantian philosophy reflected the forward, scientific impulse of the enlightenment period, by establishing the possibility and validity of science as grounded in the nature of consciousness. Consciousness is no longer simply the sum of perceptions and conceptions. It is conceived by Kant as composed of fixed categories which make scientific procedure possible and valid. That is, science is, *per se*, a certain mode of conscious activity, the mode itself being fixed in the nature of consciousness. Kant thus made man the lawgiver within the phenomenal, physical world. But for him ultimate reality still rested in a Deity whose mind is constructive.

Fichte introduced a yet larger conception of consciousness by making it include not only experience and science, but the world of ultimate moral values as well. He conceived consciousness not only as law-giving for the objective world, but also as morally constructive, identified with the constructive mind of the Deity, and expressing itself by this moral activity in the objective world. Fichte's conception of the individual thus raises him to unity with the Deity, a phase of the single consciousness, actually creating the objective world. Reality is thus, no longer, as in part with Kant, beyond and outside of human consciousness, but consists in the constructive activity of self-expression.

Schelling added still another moment to this conception of the

individual by emphasizing the relation of consciousness to the results of past activities. That is, reality is stated not merely in terms of activity at any given moment (Fichte), but in terms of this on the basis of former constructive activity.

Now Hegel combines all of these elements in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, and brings to final expression the element of progress implied in Schelling's system. For Hegel, consciousness and ultimate reality are identical. The individual is thus free and is lawgiver within his own world of reality (Kant). Consciousness is again essentially *active*, creative (Fichte), and yet again is active *process* (Schelling). Hegel thus conceives of consciousness as developing in logical order, overcoming opposition to self, or recognition of objectivity by reducing the opposition to terms of relation in a yet larger self, each occurrence of thus overcoming the antithesis between self and not-self constituting a new point of vantage whereby the self passes on to a still higher stage of development. Hegel brought all reality, historical as well as immediate, within the sphere of the logical development of consciousness. He completed the transfer from objective substance to subject, gave final expression to the freedom of the individual, and made the moment of progress central in the definition of consciousness.

The philosophical tendency in the present century has been to temper the one-sided, extreme Hegelian idealism by an increasing adherence to the results of psychological science, with a consequent emphasis on the immediate content and function of consciousness, and with a corresponding relaxation of the effort to define consciousness in terms of ultimate reality. On the one hand this tendency has resulted in a more modest conception of the individual as related to the Absolute, while on the other it has increased in large degree the conception of the relationship of the individual to a larger organism, society. Aside from the purely psychological inquiry as to the function and content of consciousness as such, philosophy has contented itself with stating the functions of the individual, his capacity, norm of conduct, laws of development, as a member of the social whole. But the conception of freedom, of activity, progress, development, worked out by the Kantian and post-Kantian systems is taken for granted as fundamental in the present-day conception of the individual.

Stated from the religious standpoint, however, the modern individual is defined in quite different terms, or rather with added terms.

Theological science readily grants the assumption of philosophical psychology, that consciousness is dynamic, that the individual is functionally related to the social whole; but as philosophy takes for its point of departure psycho-logical process, so theology takes for its point of departure the psycho-religious activity of consciousness, and defines the individual accordingly. On one hand, this results immediately in a richer conception of the Absolute, for the Absolute of theology is not only such as is demanded by the logical point of view of philosophy, but is also such as is demanded by the point of view of religious life, which includes the rich content of an imaginary world of perfect being, of emotional fellowship with kindred spirits, and of communion with the Absolute Father.

The individual of philosophy is free, active, in organic relationship to a world of beings like himself, yet each different in capacity and direction of development. The individual of theology is free, active, but also blessed in the realization of an immediate relationship to the Father of life; inspired by the sense of a vocation in the world subject to the call and direction of the Father; abounding in enthusiasm and hope and endeavor in the sense of freedom to be the child and do the will of God unchecked and uncompelled by any external authority; humbled and exalted by the sense of a capacity for infinite development; trusting in a Father's love freely and naturally bestowed, not judicially forced, upon spirits essentially akin to the Father Spirit.

How large a place in modern history this religious individual has filled may be noted by the mere reference to the great movements of modern times which, traced back through every branch of political, social, and religious life, find their origin largely in the religious principle announced by Martin Luther.

Stated in terms of philosophy and theology,—and the point of view of one is precisely as valid as that of the other,—the modern individual is characterized by intellectual, moral, and religious freedom, by dynamic originality, by progressive activity, by constant functioning of his own activity with respect to the social whole, and by immediate relationship to God.

It is the task of this paper to show the relation of the work of Thomas Aquinas to the origin and development of this individual.

I.

TWO TYPES OF THOUGHT IN WESTERN MEDIÆVAL LIFE.

The entire significance of Thomas Aquinas in relation to the origin of the modern spirit is due to the fact of a unique intellectual situation in Europe at the time his *Summa Theologiæ* was given to the world. There were, side by side, two distinct types of thought, neither of which by itself could have resulted in the modern conception of the individual. But finally brought into clear realization of each other, largely by the finished system of Thomas, these two types of thought yield a third,—the beginning of modern individualism.

The naïve, barbaric consciousness of Germanic Europe required centuries of sharp conflict before it could appropriate and utilize the civilization of classical Greece and Rome. During the first eight centuries of the mediæval period the general type of life and thought upon which the church was endeavoring to build the Holy Roman Empire is characterized by an almost imperceptible development out of semi-barbarism in the direction of that culture which the Renaissance of the fifteenth century finally brought in. The average man of the first part of the mediæval period was conscious of little else beyond his own immediate physical surroundings and his immediate necessities. He was an obedient, unquestioning child and servant of an institution which controlled his political life, manipulated his moral conduct, demanded his complete obedience and assent to its authority, and in return for this acquiescence calmed his barbaric fear of death and the world of darkness, vouchsafed to him life, peace, blessedness in a new world beyond the grave. One of the prime elements in this barbaric consciousness was sensibility of a portentous institution which refused to be questioned, criticised, or understood, but must be obeyed. The sense of absolute dependence upon the church was inculcated not only by dire punishment of disobedience, but by assurance of still more dreadful retribution in the life to come. The mediæval individual thus naïvely accepted the situation brought to him by the empire of the church, and dared not, cared not, to question the validity of the régime.

In diametrical contrast and opposition to this barbaric conscious-

ness was the type of thought which was bearer of the concepts of ancient philosophy fostered by the church and involved in its dogmatic system. The theology of the church was in a state of gradual precipitation, a process whereby traditional dogmas were slowly but surely assuming the character of finality, universality, authority, but a process which had its *raison d'être* in the foundation of dogma on the basis of ancient Greek philosophy. The church as institution gradually assumed control and lordship over philosophy, and made it the instrument whereby the process of systematizing and fixing dogma was maintained. Thus within the church was a closed system of thought, composed on the one hand of modified concepts of Greek philosophy, and on the other of the results of the elaboration of the Christian religion at the hands of this philosophy. This philosophic elaboration, to be sure, was less original and independent than in the Patristic period, but it was so simply because the church as institution had gradually gained complete control of philosophizing and compelled it to subserve only the dogmatic, institutional ends of the church. All philosophy was church philosophy, and church philosophy was essentially the inheritance passed down from the Greek systems. This type of thought within the church, permitted and used only for the ends of the church, was scholastic theology, in its earlier stage. Analyzed, it is seen to consist of the uncritical use of traditional concepts for the purpose of subserving the temporal as well as religious interests of the church, both as religious institution and as Holy Roman Empire.

Each of these two types of thought in the first stage of the mediæval period existed in an acute state. The barbaric, naïve consciousness could hardly have been more barbaric, and the scholastic discipline as a philosophy *in* the church, and a philosophy *of* the church, could hardly have been more blind, uncritical, and dogmatic. Even the human and psychological element introduced by Augustine, which was his great and lasting contribution to the development of thought, failed to take root for a period of five hundred years. The calm acceptance and willing promotion of the feudal system serves to illustrate the blind, unsubjective, uncritical type of thought common to the great mass of people in mediæval Europe, while the spread of the Holy Roman Empire, the erection of magnificent cathedrals and feudal castles, illustrates as well the institutional, universally authoritative character of the church carrying the concepts of universality and authority over from ancient philosophy and presenting

them to the admiration of a naïve people and demanding their servitude.

Now, it is because Thomas Aquinas brought to final form the concepts involved in the traditional theology of the church, and thus completed the antithesis of these two types of thought, that his work was of prime influence on the results of that contact. It would be an error, of course, to fix the origin of modern individualism in any historical situation brought about by the life and work of a single man, for in the worst environment human nature still possesses a tendency to develop, and the Catholic Church, however severe the servitude she may bring to the human spirit, has still ever exercised a certain amount of pedagogic, civilizing influence over barbaric peoples. It is nevertheless true that the historic development out of which sprang the consciousness of the modern individual was brought to a crisis by the work of Thomas Aquinas.

An analysis of the principles involved in the system of Thomas and the results of their presentation to the naïve consciousness of mediaeval Europe constitutes in detail the task of the following sections.

II.

THOMAS' FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON.

The central point of the Thomistic system, from which the entire *Summa Theologiæ* logically radiates, is the distinction between faith and reason.

The problem of the relation of faith and reason, the fact that they were presented to Thomas as related elements to be discriminated, is due, on the one hand, to the strong current of orthodox mysticism proceeding from Bernard of Clairveaux (d. 1153) and the Victorines (Hugo, d. 1141; Richard, d. 1173); on the other hand, to an increasing scientific study of nature (Gerbert, d. 1003; John of Salisbury, d. 1180) and the revival of Aristotelian logic.

Truth, according to Thomas, in its last analysis, is unitary, but in its mode of apprehension is double (*duplex veritatis modus*). There is truth which transcends all human power of understanding (*ratio*): for example, God is three and one. But there is also truth which is attainable by natural reason (*ratio*). The distinction here, however, is not on the side of truth, but on the side of our mode of apprehension (*cognitio*). That is, final truth cannot possess a double, contradictory character. Nor does the double mode of apprehension of truth determine the line of division between the natural and the supernatural, for certain truths pertaining to God are attainable by reason (*ratio*), since the study of nature, though incomplete, invariably leads back to a certain amount of knowledge of God. The subject-matter of faith and of reason thus overlap, and this is because, on the one hand, the end of all thought, hence of reason, as such, is divine truth, ultimately God, the one unitary Truth; and on the other hand because the great mass of mankind, the unlearned, the careworn, the dull and the lazy, would never possess the truth were it not attainable by some other mode than the process of science and logic. There is, then, for divine truth, a double mode of apprehension, faith and reason. Reason can apprehend certain, but not all divine truth, but where the rational process ceases, faith begins for each individual and the realm of truth is still open to him.

According to Thomas, it follows from the foregoing that there is a double source of knowledge of divine truth, namely, divine revelation and human reason. The highest good, to whose attainment all humanity is directed, transcends all which the present life can experience or know. But nothing can be held as an ideal or goal which is not first cognized, hence this highest, super-rational good, must be revealed. Thus we know God truly when we think Him exalted above all which man can think about God. Thomas seems to mean by this that when the concepts of reason have been exhausted in defining the attributes of God, revelation declares that God is still more and greater, and faith gives assent, and since the source of the "higher truth" is revelation, faith has precedence over reason even to transcending the latter, as, for example, in the proposition, *Deum trinum esse et unum*.

But if man must thus believe super-rational, divine things, lest faith fail to hold its own in the world of the real and rational, and lest it become a vague, indifferent attitude or act of mind, revelation must be mediated to man by way of the corporeal and historical. Hence signs and wonders, miracles of healing, etc., to establish the credibility of the super-rational truth. Again, if this revelation is necessary in order to man's attainment of the highest good, then there can be no contradiction between the truths of reason and the truths of revelation, for such a contradiction would set up an essential, insurmountable opposition between man and his highest good. The unavoidable difficulty here is evaded by Thomas by the assertion that whatever revealed seems to contradict reason is Christian mystery, and God is its source, and great are the mysteries. The mysteries of Christianity cannot be apodictically demonstrated or comprehended.

On the basis of this relationship of faith and reason to truth, Thomas discusses the content of the mind in its attitude toward recognized truth, and develops the notions of knowledge, faith (or belief), and opinion. The intellect assents to anything in two ways:

(a) By being moved to assent by the object itself, cognition taking place by reason of an immediate appeal to known qualities; or by being moved by some other thing, so that cognition takes place mediately, in conclusions by known terms. And

(b) By being moved by a volutary impulse, choice. In this case, (the willing to believe), if doubt is still mingled with the intellectual assent, it is opinion; if all doubt is eliminated, it is faith or belief.

The fact that faith has an element of volition in it does not give

the primacy to the will, for even the act of will in determining intellectual assent is grounded in a *habitus* of faith and is indeed an act of faith. Faith (*fides*) thus stands midway between knowledge (*scientia*) and opinion (*opinio*). So much for the relation between faith and knowledge on the subjective side. It is, however, the objective conditioning of the act which, in Thomas's view, fixes the abiding character and relative value of faith and knowledge. For the truth attained by faith, we are indebted to authority; but for what comes by knowledge, we are indebted to reason. Belief (faith) rests upon the objective ground of authority; knowledge is conditioned by the insight and evidence of reason. But this authority for faith is no less than the revelation proceeding from God Himself, hence faith takes precedence over knowledge; and again, since God is the absolute, highest Truth, faith results in greater certainty than does reason. Reason may err, but the divine truth is infallible. While empirical facts stand as the presuppositions of faith (*præambula fidei*), yet this precedence of knowledge over faith is only incidental and formal. The function of faith, as related to objective authority, and the material with which faith deals, make faith the guiding principle, the norm for reason in all investigation and scientific elaboration of Christian truth. Moreover, the formal precedence of empirical knowledge as presupposition of faith is limited strictly to the empirical facts of Christianity, and so again the ultimate priority of faith is shown, since Christianity is larger than empirical facts, and is drawn from a supernatural source.

The relation between science and faith, between philosophy and theology, is thus the relation of servant to master. Philosophy forms the presupposition of theology only in the sense that theology calls in philosophy as an aid for the purpose of elaborating and codifying the truth already established theologically by revelation and faith. The will to believe thus lies at the very basis of the rational process, and in essence and in act, this will belongs to the realm of faith. Philosophy is the science of reason; theology is the science of revelation. The source of knowledge for philosophy is likewise reason, and the source for theology is revelation. One treats truth in so far as it can be proved by reason; the other treats it in so far as it is revealed by God, and each is an integral, unitary science. Philosophy treats of creation in its essence and attributes, while theology treats it in its relation to God. Philosophy establishes its proof on the nature of the thing; theology rests proof on the source of the thing.

From the examination of the essence, properties, and laws of created things, philosophy rises to consideration and knowledge (limited) of God. Theology reverses this method. From consideration of God and His attributes, theology descends to created things in order to examine their relation to God. Theology is thus prior in character, in subject-matter, in method, and uses philosophy as her hand-maiden. This use of philosophy introduces into theology a speculative moment.

Such, in brief, is the Thomistic distinction between faith and reason and the corresponding conceptions deduced.

One may see at a glance that the distinction with all its consequences is unqualifiedly based on the Roman Catholic principle of dualism between nature and the supernatural, between the universal and the particular, and on the conception of salvation as a supra-mundane condition to be realized finally by participation in super-rational reality. By the entire method and content of his statement, Thomas is committed to the Catholic principle of uncritical assent to truth, and truth is clearly conceived according to the contention of realism. Indeed, by birth, by training, and by the voluntary direction and use of magnificent natural powers as well as broad erudition, Thomas is a Catholic of the Catholics, and his *Summa Theologiæ* is the final expression of the universality, infallibility, and authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church. Faith and reason, at the center of the Thomistic system, are essentially and typically the faith and reason of the Græco-Roman-Scholastic mediæval church institution.

III.

THE THOMISTIC PRINCIPLE OF FAITH AND REASON IN RELATION TO MODERN INDIVIDUALISM.

At first sight the foregoing scholastic conceptions of truth, revelation, reason, philosophy, and theology, with the underlying discrimination between faith and reason, would appear to be diametrically opposed to the modern definition of these terms. But, on the other hand, there is hardly an element—intellectual, moral, or religious—involved in the conception of the modern individual, which is not concealed in the above fundamental concepts as stated and used by Thomas Aquinas.

It is to be first noted that the problem of the relation of faith and reason is a psychological problem, though, of course, Thomas did not recognize it primarily as such, and stated it merely in the interests of the truth as held by the Catholic Church. Thomas's statement of the subjective aspect of knowledge, faith, and opinion is clearly the revival of the psychological interest created by Augustine, disregarded for five hundred years, then again coming to the fore in the two centuries preceding Thomas. Thomas's connection here with modern psychology is not indeed that he valued psychology as fundamental, nor that he gave any thorough or extended psychological statement of his problem, but it is that the distinction between faith and reason is in fact simply a psychological distinction, however inadequately, or, according to modern method, unscientifically expressed. Since this distinction was the central and fundamental principle in Thomas's system, and since his system was the final statement of Catholicism, the relation of faith and reason was thus raised to the degree of fundamental importance. A rudimentary psychology was thus legitimized within the Catholic Church, and at the moment Catholic theology was made a closed and final system, and by the very effort that made it such, there was legitimized a fundamental principle which three centuries later, though not scientifically valued, nevertheless served to destroy the system which had been based upon it. For what was the Reformation, if not primarily the recognition of faith and reason, and their mutual relationship,

as fundamental? Thomas Aquinas gave prime importance and validity to faith and reason stated in terms of objective truth and their relation to this truth. But the fundamental validity and importance of faith and reason aroused the consciousness of that religious, rational subjectivity which finally came to expression in Martin Luther. Henceforth faith and reason were the instruments used in behalf of a subject, not modes of communication and control used in the interests of an object. In other words, the principle of faith and reason as stated and used by Thomas presupposes the principle of *internality*, which was, in fact, stated by Augustine, but in such a manner and under such conditions that it was not raised to the position of authority given it by its use in Thomas's system and by its presentation to the type of consciousness represented by the Germanic people.

In addition to this principle of internality, faith is given a dynamic character by the reference of the act of belief to the will. This is merely a subterfuge, to be sure, for in no other way could Thomas account for faith as an act on a level at least with the clearly recognized act of reason. But having thus by an appeal to will avoided the Scylla of viewing faith as a vague, indifferent state of consciousness, Thomas at once plunges into the Charybdis of a contradiction by referring will to a habit of faith. Therein he is truly the dogmatic scholastic. But the element of value here is that though supernatural, objective truth is really the goal of faith, in attempting to account for the act of faith in attaining to the truth, Thomas was compelled to give the act an ethical content. In what respect does this differ from the faith of the modern individual? Only in this: The faith of Thomas was a religio-rational process with objective truth as its goal, while the faith of the modern individual is a religio-ethical process with its goal subjective. The end of faith for Thomas was knowledge of transcendent truth. The end of faith for the modern individual is conduct. Faith for both lays hold on God and links the soul with Him. But for Thomas this union is metaphysical, a state to be perfectly realized only in the world to come, for the human and the divine are generically different, separated by the dualism which cleaves the universe of reality into two opposed worlds. For the modern individual this union is ethical, present, since for him the human spirit is generically one with the divine, and his one world knows no dualism. But it is precisely because Thomas announced as a fundamental presupposition of his closed, final system the dynamic

character of faith that the faith of the people awoke to the consciousness of its initiative, dynamic, responsible, ethical character. Faith and will, in Protestantism, are of the same formal relationship to each other and to truth as in Thomas's system, but the act of faith as defined by Thomas was the first step in the development of a new conception of the function and content of faith,—a development of such momentous import that it was no less than the prime factor in a Reformation which defined anew even truth itself.

Again, according to Thomas, the highest good is a far-off goal, toward which faith and reason struggle on, assisting and supplementing each other, though faith is always prior. Now, by his definition of truth and this process of its attainment, it is evident that faith and reason are, after all, two sides of a knowledge process,—that is, faith is a religio-rational process supplementing the purely rational. But what is of significance here, is the element of progress involved in this definition of the activity of faith and reason in their relation to truth. It may not be amiss, therefore, to state that the notion of progress, which is the kernel of the Hegelian philosophy, is the legitimate and final outcome of a development which received its initial modern impulse in Thomas' conception of the rational process of faith and reason.

Of great significance also is Thomas' argument for the proposition that faith and reason overlap in their activity. This, he says, is because the great mass of men are unlearned, lacking in logical acumen, preoccupied, so that exercise of reason for the purpose of obtaining truth is impossible. Hence they have provided for them the instrument of faith, and revelation affords them many truths which only the few can attain by reason. This was, in purpose, an argument to establish the comprehensive scope of revelation and its priority over reason, and was thus purely Catholic. But it is also, in fact, a direct argument for the possibility of the exercise of faith and the attainment of truth by the humblest man. What more direct and what greater impulse toward the freedom of the individual could be given? Thomas supposed he was serving the Roman Church, making secure her authority by thus establishing the priority and scope of revelation. But the very effort to do this in reality freed faith and reason from the confines of the clerical oligarchy. Had the writings of Aquinas been accessible to the common people, the Protestant Reformation would have followed close on the *Summa Theologiæ*, and it would have found its text for freedom and subjectivity in the very

words with which the champion of Catholicism sought to extend, strengthen, and complete the authority and rule of the Catholic Church. The naïve mass of German people could not read the letter of Thomas' system, but men breathed the spirit of freedom with which, all unwittingly, he had freighted the letter; slowly this spirit of freedom came to expression, and finally Martin Luther, the son of a peasant slate-cutter, took Thomas Aquinas at his word, and declared the substance of faith to be ethical will, and the human spirit free, dynamic, responsible, related immediately to revelation and to God, the source of all truth. That priority of faith over reason, for which Thomas so ardently contended, was Martin Luther's text for the essentially religious character of the human spirit, and inasmuch as faith is free and to be freely exercised by all, a text also for the religious independence of the individual.

The influence of the ethical element in Thomas' definition of faith is clearly seen in the fact that Duns Scotus (d. 1380) immediately followed with his philosophy of will. Again, the influence of Thomas' distinction between faith and reason is seen in the Scotist formal separation of religion and science, a division which it was, in fact, one of the great purposes of the *Summa Theologiæ* to make impossible. And again, following the cue given by Thomas's characterization of the priority of faith and its rationalistic nature in relation to objective truth, Eckhart (d. 1329) developed his idealistic mysticism, which wanted only the ethical moment, appearing later in the Reformation, to be truly Protestant in character.

The program for modern science is clearly laid down in Thomas' distinction between reason and faith, and the subject-matter and method ascribed to each. Faith starts with the conception of God, from that works downward to the world of matter in order to examine the relation of God to created things. This is clearly and explicitly the deductive method of the Hellenistic-scholastic philosophy. But, on the other hand, reason starts with created things, and works upward through examination of them to a certain amount of knowledge about God and the relation of the world to God. This is purely the inductive method, to-day fundamental for every science. Here again, it is to be noted that Thomas did not purposely announce a new program for science. He meant only to distinguish between the reverse methods of faith and reason, solely for the purpose of establishing the priority of the former, for God, supernatural truth, is the subject-matter of faith as against created things, the subject-

matter of reason. Following out this distinction of method for faith and reason, Thomas consistently related theology and philosophy in the same manner, but with the result that the world of things thus became the primary subject-matter of philosophy. There is thus a remarkable transition of philosophy from ancient metaphysics, the scholastic field, to physics, while theology occupies the metaphysical realm as sole master. The transition was but partial, however, for philosophy was still metaphysics in the sense that it is used as a logical aid for clarifying and elaborating the truth given in revelation and maintained by theology. Nevertheless, under the name of philosophy, scientific research was given its freedom, its method was declared inductive, and by declaring reason the obverse method of faith for every individual in his upward struggle for truth, reason, therefore philosophy, and therefore science, were declared the possessions and the instruments of the individual, not of the church. This was furthest from Thomas' explicit purpose. It was his purpose to include all knowledge, all science, in his *Summa Theologiæ*, the final expression of the universal intellectual and religious proprietorship of the church. But by making fast this feudalism of the church through the religious (revelation, faith) rule and priority, he so defined reason (philosophy, study of nature) as an aid to faith and theology that he over-reached his own purpose and gave science a far more important and independent task and method than was in any sense consistent with its intended character as the bond-servant of the church.

A decisive moment for the freeing of reason as scientific research was also implicit in Thomas' conception of reason in contrast to revelation as a source of truth. The parallelism based on the distinction between faith and reason breaks down at the last moment. The two realms of truth (although truth is unitary) are the natural and the supernatural. The two beings with whom truth is concerned are God and Man. The two sources of truth are revelation and reason. But the two modes of the apprehension of truth are faith and reason. Reason thus appears twice, as both source and mode of apprehension of truth. From the point of view of the great world of supernatural truth, presented to man as revelation, this contrast of revelation and reason, as sources, belittles man's reason. This was precisely Thomas' point of view. But it follows with equal certainty that whoever would take the scientific point of view and look upon the exercise of reason as in itself a source for truth, would put an equally

high estimate on reason, not as contrasted, but as yoked with revelation. This was bound to result, moreover, because this coupling of reason with revelation had been finally and authoritatively stated by the church itself, in its effort to dominate the entire field of reason, and subjugate it to the realm of revelation and faith.

It was of small moment that in providing against this homage to reason Thomas should define it, not in terms of individual, scientific research, but as the universal, natural fountain of knowledge. However abstract he might make the conception of reason, men realized immediately on applying the program that it was their own individual, rational, scientific endeavors which really afforded them access to the truths of nature. The effort to refute this position would, therefore, appear to be a mere subterfuge, and would so much the more hasten the freedom of science and its honor as an independent, reliable source of truth.

If we were to try to explain this free scientific impulse implicit in Thomas Aquinas, in spite of his championship of the absolute, dogmatic authority of the church, we might refer to the humanist reaction of the preceding century against the extreme, one-sided, scholastic, dogmatic method of the schools. But that would not in the least invalidate the assertion that for the modern period the roots of scientific freedom and of the inductive method as applied to science are to be found in the ground principle of Thomas Aquinas' system. For in saying the last thing in behalf of the universal control of the church, Thomas expressed the Catholic idea with such clearness and decisiveness, that the definition of the new method and subject-matter for reason (philosophy and natural science),—incidentally given, indeed,—obtained like decisiveness and significance for succeeding time.

Finally, what is of greatest significance for modern individualism, is the destruction of the ancient dualism between nature and the supernatural, by Thomas' definition of truth and by the implication in his definition of the related activities of faith and reason.

Thomas very definitely opposed the earlier mediæval conception of truth as "two-fold." He declared that truth is one, unitary, because God is the source of all truth. He maintained that the truths of reason and those of faith could never contradict each other; that which contradicts one, contradicts the other. This, however, was not intended to obliterate the distinction between nature and the supernatural as two different realms, for the definition of truth as "two-

fold" was a contention between natural and revealed theology, not between empirical science and theology. It is reason exercised with the purpose of aiding faith in the appropriation of revelation, of which Thomas speaks. According to Thomas, there are two distinct realms, this world and a higher, and the truth, the highest good toward which humanity must struggle, is the truth of the higher realm, even the truth of God Himself. That higher world is absolutely severed from this world. Between the two there is absolutely no connection save that of grace and revelation. But while man must live his life in this world only to prepare for life in another world, this however is true: truth as man knows it, by reason in the things of this world, by faith in the things of the other world, is unitary. While man must live in two worlds, he knows but one truth. No truth of the present life can set aside the revealed truth of the life to come, and if there seems to be a contradiction between the truth of reason and that of revelation, if, for example, man reasons that three people are three people, but believes by faith that one God is three persons, the difficulty is not with truth, but with the temporary limitations of man's vision of the truth. Reason must gracefully yield to faith, for, who can say, is not reason bound, by its very nature and function, in some good time of fruition to understand the truth of faith, though now it can see only through a glass darkly? So, Thomas affirms, whatever may seem to be true for the moment, truth really and ultimately is one. On one side this fixes more firmly than ever the dualism between the two worlds, for it emphasizes the supernatural even to the extent of discrediting man's rational powers for the sake of truth attained by faith.

But there is another side, and the implication is a mighty one. If truth, *in spite of reason*, is true for both worlds, wherein exists the real distinction between the natural and the supernatural? The distinction which Thomas makes is the difference between the material, visible world and the spiritual; but if these come together in their truth, in their *meaning* for the human spirit, wherein does there still exist any distinction whatever? The only remaining distinction possible is one of time and space, a difference in corporeality. This is indeed the Thomistic, Platonic-realistic basis of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and is clearly indicated in his Angelology, and in his treatment of the principle of individuation. It is by no means a new distinction for Thomas. It is as old as Greek philosophy, and is the basis for the entire supernaturalistic and escha-

tological dogma of the Catholic Church. But by claiming that there is no dualism in truth, while still asserting the reality of another world, Thomas implies an entirely new conception of reality, and contradicts himself. The momentous implication is that *the present world is spiritualized*, for by this means only can the unity of truth be maintained. But if this world is spiritualized, it simply is one with the spiritual world, that is, there is generically but one World, one universe of Reality for the human spirit. What is here, and what is true now, is to be thought and expressed in terms of the world of spirit and spiritual truth; that is, this world is but one phase of the unitary Spiritual Reality. That this is the unavoidable implication in Thomas' conception of truth may be clearly seen also in his definition of the functions of faith and reason. Faith is prior; that is, man is primarily and essentially spiritual, for faith is the organ of the spirit, and the means of attaining *spiritual* truth. But though faith has infinite truth for its subject-matter, it also has finite truth (i. e., truth which can be attained by reason); for revelation, Thomas clearly says, extends to these things, because without this wide scope of revelation the great mass of unthinking men would not be able to possess the truth, and faith is the organ in them whereby this revelation is appropriated; that is, the less capable of logic a man is, by so much the more must he be essentially spiritual in the exercise of his faculties, in his hold on truth, though of course he cannot know any more truth than the man who attains a part of this truth by philosophy. It is very evident, therefore, on the side of faith, that Thomas' definition of truth and the process of appropriation of it results simply in spiritualizing all truth and the means of its apprehension; that is, the real dualism between the natural and the supernatural is obliterated. But when we turn to the function of reason, this is still more evident. Reason deals first with the world of things, in order to find its way to God. But again, it elaborates the truth which faith supplies, and in doing this distinctly enters the field of the spiritual. But further, if reason, dealing with the world of things, is led to the spiritual,—that is, if the truth discovered in nature is spiritual truth,—how can the conclusion be avoided that the distinctive field of reason is as truly spiritual as the field of faith? That is, again, reason in its function and activity is as truly spiritual as faith, though, according to Thomas, and in the interests of revelation and the church, not so *exclusively* spiritual. The clear implication, therefore, fundamental in Thomas' system, is that there is no dualism

between nature and Spirit, between Man and God, though his effort was to maintain such a dualism, with the Roman Catholic Church in the breach as mediator.

Now, this spiritualization of the world is at the very core of the Protestant principle. The modern individual, stated in religious terms, has one world, one life, one present, energizing, All-Father, and the human spirit is generically one with the divine. Eternal life is now. Communion and union with God are as distinctly real now as they ever can be, at least potentially so. There is no "New Jerusalem," no Judgment, no Salvation, other than the temple of the human spirit where God and Man meet; the judgment-bar of the human conscience enlightened by the divine Presence; the Salvation of human character by the power of God that "*worketh in*" the human spirit. But this may be entirely and simply the elaboration of the text of Thomas Aquinas' definition of truth, faith, and reason, though it is indeed infinitely far removed from his conception of God, Man, and Salvation.

Conversely, stated in terms of philosophy, the modern individual naturalizes the world of spirit. That is, the world of things exists only in terms of psychic experience, and all truth, whether of past present, or future, is, and is stated to the human mind, only in terms of its own experience. But this is "natural." It is the order of the world, and it is truly spiritual, which means, simply, psychic. Philosophy, therefore, like theology, denies another world of time and space to which alone the category "spiritual" can apply. And theology, like philosophy, denies any reality of the present world which cannot be stated in terms of the experience of the human spirit. "Natural" and "supernatural," for both philosophy and theology, are simply different terms in a unitary spiritual reality. But this is implicit in the unitary truth, and in reason and faith, two modes of apprehension of the truth, as defined by Thomas Aquinas.

It is not claimed, of course, that the foregoing connections of Thomas Aquinas' fundamental principle with the modern view of the individual cannot be traced, in part at least, to other pre-Reformation systems of thought, both before and after Thomas. The contention is simply that Thomas' contribution to the development of the modern individual is decisive, more decisive than that of any other man or system of the mediæval period, and this is due to new increments which his system added to the growing spirit of freedom in the Germanic people, as well as to the authoritative character given

to his principles by the authority which he occupied in church and state, and to the finished, comprehensive statement which he gave to existing knowledge. While Thomas lived, he might largely influence the interpretation placed on his own literary production. But when he had passed away, men began to study the *Summa* as text, and inevitably the universal method of commentary and interpretation began, with the necessary result that fragmentary portions of his works were studied simply for what they contained, not in relation to the whole, or in the spirit in which the whole system was conceived. Taken critically, and by this method, there are parts of Thomas' system upon which the whole modern religious and scientific development might be legitimately based, and it is clearly certain, that at the very center of his system, in spirit, in method, in point of view, the modern individual is concealed. It needed only some patient prying on the part of the growing, critical, inquisitive German spirit to bring him forth.

IV.

THE THOMISTIC DOGMA "CHURCH."

The Catholic theology of the last seven centuries has been the theology of Thomas Aquinas. With the exception of a more polemical definition of the Authority of the Catholic Church by Cardinal Bellarmine (d. 1621), and the Vatican decree of Papal Infallibility (1870), there has been no addition of moment to the theological system of Thomas Aquinas, and these two additions are, in fact, only more emphatic statements of the position already clearly taken by Thomas. The remainder of this paper, therefore, is not simply a consideration of the relation of Thomas' system in itself to the modern spirit, but is as truly an examination of the relationship of Catholicism as a whole to the modern development. The problem may be stated thus: What initial impulse to Protestantism is contained in Catholicism? At the same time the problem arises out of conditions consummating at a given time, namely, the completion by Thomas of the statement of Catholic theology, and the presentation of this closed system to the growing, critical German mind. Our examination, therefore, will be held more closely to the immediate relation of the Catholicism of Thomas' time to the general type of consciousness of that period, rather than to the later development.

The statement of the problem in the above form will be objected to at once by a conservative orthodoxy which maintains, assumes rather, that an absolutely new religion was created by the Fathers of the Reformation. To prove, on the contrary, that the reformers simply grew out of the Catholicism of their time, as branch grows from trunk, it is necessary only to refer to the high estimate which they placed on the œcumenical symbols. Calvin laid great stress on the so-called Apostolic symbol. Luther estimated the Athanasian symbol as one of the most beautiful masterpieces of the Holy Spirit since Apostolic times. Zwingli regarded the œcumenical symbols as the faithful expression of Biblical doctrine. Melancthon maintained the truth and pure Catholicity of the leaders of the Reformation on the basis of their agreement with the Christian tradition (Catholic). The dogmatic formulas of the Catholic Church were

worked over by the reformers into Confessions of Faith, which soon became official documents, tests, for the evangelical communities. Article IX. of the Augsburg Confession teaches that baptism is necessary to salvation. Article XI. maintains private confession. The Apology (VII., 4) maintains the three sacraments of Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and Absolution. Luther's Smaller Catechism recommends the Sign of the Cross before the morning prayer. Examples of the actual transfer of Catholic dogma and ritual into the Protestant Confessions might be multiplied. Finally, it may be recalled to mind that Luther broke with the Catholic Church only after the most strenuous effort to work a reformation within that church.

If there is thus this clear, dogmatic, documentary connection of Protestantism with Catholicism; if the reformers were in fact only disobedient children of the mother church, it is but natural that there should be found, on close examination, an actual inner, historical connection upon which these outer Protestant continuations of Catholicism really depend. Moreover, in spite of historical crises which yield epochs and periods, the development of the human race, whether in science, art, politics, or religion, is continuous, unbroken. Every new historical situation can be understood and accounted for only on the basis of prior historical conditions. Protestantism, therefore, may as well yield gracefully to the proposition that the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of the bondage which it forces upon its children, is the medium through which the Christian religion has been transferred from the Apostles to modern times, and is further, in spite of unfaithfulness to the freedom of the human spirit, the parent stock out of which has sprung the free religious spirit of modern times. So much by way of justification of the question: What initial impulse to Protestantism is contained in Catholicism?

To answer this question it will be necessary first to state the principles involved in the Catholic Dogma "Church" as given in their final form by Thomas Aquinas. He gave, in his systematic, formal expression of this dogma, no new material, hence a very brief exposition of the principles will suffice.

(1) Unity. The Catholic principle of unity sufficed as a principle of administration and propaganda, as a formidable obstacle to schisms within the church, and finally as a basis of community of interests between peoples of widely divergent culture and customs. It was on this basis that the magnificent institution of the church had reared her traditions, had fought and conquered her enemies,

and by means of her far-reaching administrative organization, had gained a political significance of which kings and potentates were compelled to take account. By mere reference to her position and traditions it was possible to impose any doctrine whatsoever upon a semi-barbaric people, with little fear of the schisms that threatened only sporadically and with ill-concealed timidity. Such hardy souls as dared to affirm any independence of religious zeal or spiritual initiative aside from that dictated and sanctioned by the church, suffered a punishment swift and terrible in the eyes of the unthinking, thus publishing effectively and strengthening the administrative power and unity of the church. But if in her administrative dictates, the church was cruel, arbitrary, and oppressive, yet by reason of her recognized unity she conserved and bound together the most diversified and antagonistic elements of European society, established inter-communication, propagated knowledge of various customs and arts, and in a way made herself the clearing-house for social, political, and educational influences at a time when the mingling and friction of various degrees of culture were necessary for the moral advancement of European peoples. But again, the binding force of this authoritative unity, while conservative and helpful in the days of semi-barbarism, became a positive check and hindrance as soon as men learned to think independently, and in their intellectual efforts attached to the culture and freedom of Greek antiquity.

(2) Catholicity. Closely allied to the principle of unity was the principle of catholicity: the dogma of the universal claim of the church to the subservience and homage of all men of all times. In her adherence to this principle the church not only fostered a missionary propaganda, but became the church militant, claiming by right of divine institution the souls of all men,—to be gained by the peaceful means of appeal to the superstitious regard of her symbolism and ritual if possible, by means of coercion, inquisition, and political intrigue if need be. Nor did this claim of catholicity extend merely to the spiritual interests of men. It was forced to cover all the institutions and endeavors of men,—political, social, industrial,—on the assumption that the business of life is religion, and the one universal dispenser of religion is the Catholic Church, by virtue of which office all interests of mankind were subjugated to her control and direction.

(3) Sanctity. The claims of unity and catholicity could be urged easily upon a people in whom the religious sense was a superstitious awe of the unseen spiritual forces of the world, if coupled with these

claims was that of sanctity, participation in which would secure the soul against the terrors of the dark beyond, the more so as these terrors were depicted as doubly awful to those who hesitated to come within the fold of the church, the one and only holy body, the only source of holiness, and the only retreat from the effects of unholiness. One of the most interesting features of historical catholicism is the fact that the church was able so to urge her claim of sanctity that the mere denial of this claim was easily stamped as the extreme and last sin of mankind! The church had only to assert her claim. To deny it was a sin which far outweighed the balance of the entire catalogue of man's sins. She could say that God had vested in her absolute holiness, and whoever dared to question the assertion was absolutely unholy. Thus ran the magic, but stupid argument. The church could go still further. She could claim that in her alone was vested the entire dispensation of grace, and that without submission to her, salvation from sin and its punishments was impossible, both in this life and in the life to come. And the unthinking—nay, the sin-burdened, though ignorant—believed and submitted. If argument were needed to prove the claim, behold the rich symbolism, the great and glorious past, the ever-present tokens of a unified and powerful institution, and a final—and to a questioning but simple-minded people a fearfully convincing—argument, the tortures of the Inquisition! To be sure, the Catholic Church, attaching in its origin to the Apostolic tradition and the Gospel of Jesus, would not forget altogether the teachings and spirit of early Christianity. But the church found itself, in the decline of Rome and the mediæval period, confronting conditions that could not be mastered save by the immediate presentation of visible symbols and accompaniments of salvation, and the accumulation, systematization, and extension of these into the gigantic organism of the Catholic Church kept pace with the temper of the times. It was not, in fact, an institution foisted upon an unwilling people, but was welcomed by the masses as filling their needs. The delegated and transferable, purchasable sanctity of the church was the only safe, attainable, sure sanctity which the times could apprehend.

(4) Apostolicity. But the church was never quite free from the danger of schisms and sporadic internal reformations, intellectual and moral, which threatened open outbreak. It was inevitable, therefore, that all questioning of her authenticity and authority should be at least partially forestalled by the claim of apostolicity. Whence

her authority? God, Jesus, Apostles, Fathers, Pope. The succession was unbroken. God, aloof from the world, was yet pleased to bridge the chasm between infinite goodness and pitiful sin by the crucified, risen Lord, and the chasm between the cross and the present by the unbroken line of divinely chosen heads of the church. Outside of this line of succession was no religious authority, no oracles of God, no true worship or true church. And nothing is more apparent than that this mechanized religiosity was the only form adaptable to the ignorant masses of mediæval Europe. If the God of Christianity could not show positive evidence of his connection with humanity and his preparedness to save, as well worship the blazing sun, the angry sea, the lightning flash, for here were visible, mysterious powers that hesitated not to speak, to smite, and to bless! In proportion as the religion of a people is mechanized and materialized do such elements as tradition, relic, succession of authority, become necessary. The mediæval believer was incapable of anything more profound than a crass, materialistic, mechanistic religion. Hence the claim of apostolicity fitted well the temper and demands of the times, and it was, for the church, the outward, tangible authority, where an inner, guiding spiritual principle was wanting.

(5) Infallibility. But in the process of historical change and development, in the manifold political exigencies, in the larger and larger problem of administrative diplomacy, it could not suffice that the judgment and action of the church should be vindicated by the claim of ancient traditions. There was needed a present vital principle which should suffice on all occasions to command acceptance and obedience to the decrees of the church. Hence the principle,—the pope, vice-regent of God on earth. When the pope speaks, God speaks. Unquestioning obedience and humble, faithful submission to the church are therefore due from all men. Here again was a principle at one with the consciousness of the times. A feudal system in religion was a necessary accompaniment of the economical feudalism, which was at once the people's blessing and curse, in that it was an indispensable conserver of order and a quasi-peaceful means of subsistence, but also a positive check on individual development. In like manner the church held together, by the dogma "Church," with all it involved, the religious interests of the times, which otherwise would have perished altogether, or dissipated into a multitude of pagan cults utterly devoid of even the small modicum of original Christian teaching offered by the church, and furnishing a basis for

bitter petty strifes, to the discomfiture and destruction of the social order. If the church repressed the individual, she nevertheless conserved the whole, gave it some outward semblance and some real consciousness of homogeneity, a basis for social organization and betterment otherwise impossible. To meet the requirements of this situation and this pedagogic office, the church found the principles of unity, catholicity, sanctity, apostolicity and infallibility absolutely necessary as instruments of organization, administration, and defense, and, however conceived or with whatever motives used, these principles were nevertheless integral with the spirit of the times, and served the times as no other religious principles could.

Thomas Aquinas was consecrated to the service of the church in his earliest infancy. He was educated by the church as one of its most promising servants, as he was, indeed, by virtue of his profound mystical spirit and his masterful mind. In young manhood he quickly took first rank among the defenders and propagandists of the Roman Church, and in political affairs was known as one of the foremost diplomatists of his time. It is not strange, therefore, that he should have given such complete, systematic, and logical statement of the position of the church. In the *Summa Theologiae* he set forth the most orderly and complete statement of catholic theology that has ever been written. In fact, catholic theology attained its final statement in the *Summa Theologiae*. Nothing of consequence has been added to or taken away from the *Summa*. If, as is probably true, the capstone of every historical system is but the foundation-stone for the succeeding system of the same generic order, it might be assumed that in some manner the theology of Thomas Aquinas was a more or less real foundation for the spirit and theology of the Reformation. With the Thomistic dogma of the "Church," analyzed into its essential principles, and with his definition of reason and faith, with all that definition involves, before us, we are in position to attempt further an answer to the question, What initial impulse to Protestantism is contained in Catholicism?

V.

THE LOGIC OF CATHOLICISM AND PROTESTANTISM.

It has been assumed by many historians that the essence of the Reformation of the fifteenth century was a moral revolt against the abuses of the catholic clergy. Such a result was, indeed, largely the practical form which the Reformation took in its earliest stages. But such an explanation of the Reformation would fail utterly to express the full content of the underlying thought and purpose of a movement which resulted almost immediately in manifold theological systems and cults, in a general outlook upon life best characterized as a feeling of freedom. The real religious principle of the Reformation as held by Luther was "Justification by faith," the material principle, and the "Inspiration of the Scriptures," the formal principle. Justification by faith, as against the justification of the catholic dispensation of grace; and the authority of the Scriptures, as against the assumed authority of papal decretals.

But it may be pertinently asked, *what* and *whence* the attitude toward the Roman Church which resulted in the statement of these principles? Was it a desire for a more strictly moral behavior on the part of clergy and laity? Then the Reformation would have taken the course of ethical reform merely. The ethical demands of the Reformation were accidental, not essential. Was it a desire for a closer "walk with God"? Then the Reformation would have taken the form of larger patronage of the monastic life, for the cloisters were close at hand and numerous, whither they who so desired might withdraw from the world and cultivate as profound an emotional mysticism as the spirit is capable of exercising. The principles of the Reformation were the outcome of an attitude that had forced itself to expression by reason of the logical content of Romanism on one hand, and the consciousness of a people just awakening to the influences of the Renaissance on the other.

It must be borne in mind that the full-fledged Romanism of Thomas Aquinas had essentially but one dogma, the dogma of the "Church." Subsequent to the patristic period there was no theology, no christology, no doctrine of sin or salvation at any time in vogue

or developed which did not fall incidentally under the larger doctrine of the "Church." The *Summa Theologiæ*, while treating of these subjects, yet comprises them within a doctrine of the church, which is the inclusive, not the included. According to Romanism there could be no theology outside of the church, but the church could easily exist with no clearly developed conception of God at all, as is, indeed, the case in catholic theology. That God exists and has the general extra-human attributes so easily predicated *a priori* suffices for the inquiry as to his nature and relationship to humanity. What is of real importance is the church which he has established and authorized as the only possible means of relationship to him, and the only possible dispenser of any most meagre knowledge of God. Now, the Thomistic dogma of the church, analyzed into its fundamental principles, presents a most striking logical content. The three principles of catholicity, apostolicity, infallibility, are clearly universals, and could be only so regarded. If it is objected that apostolicity refers to a particular group of men, it may be said that it does so only in name, not in content. Apostolicity was the name for a divine authority delegated to the church; that and nothing more, since the slightest introduction of any particular human element here would invalidate the principle of divine authority.

The principles of unity and sanctity, while apparently possible of application to a particular, were yet, as used by the church, universals. It was not that the church was a unit, some particular church, but that of the church was a *oneness* which was all-inclusive, in which any given particular was of consequence only as ministering to the universal church. The church was an end, not a means. Likewise, the principle of sanctity, while apparently applicable to at least one particular, the pope, yet was not really so, for the holiness attached to the office, not to the individual, and as such was a pure abstraction.

Thus the one inclusive dogma of Catholicism cannot be broken up into particulars. It is true that any Protestant doctrine of the church partakes largely of the same character, or may be so viewed; but the difference here between Catholicism and Protestantism consists precisely in the fact that Protestantism includes a multitude of other dogmas which are largely particular judgments, whereas Catholicism has no other dogma than the dogma "Church"; that is, one is called upon to believe in and submit himself to the church *only*. Nothing further is required in the Catholic scheme. The his-

torical fact that the precipitate of all Christian doctrine into this one dogma, essentially universal in its logical content, was the only possible form in which that religion could have been preserved and presented to modern times, does not validate the claim of the church to modern sanction on the basis of her historical service.

Now, while the doctrine of the Roman Church was receiving its final, closed, universal form in the system of Thomas Aquinas, there was an equally significant development taking place in the Germanic people,—the development of the Renaissance and Humanism. And the logical essence of this was simply the fundamental development of critique,—the power to judge. The intellectual culture acquired in the German schools between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries attached to Aristotle's Logic as center. The study of Latin, and, later, of Greek, was not emphasized until late in the period in question. It was left to the slow influence of Humanism, with its remarkable achievements in Italy, to indicate the true culture value of the Latin and Greek classics as literature. It is of profound significance for the intellectual situation at the time of the Reformation that the training of the early German schools had been so impregnated with the desire and the effort to cultivate logic as a school discipline. For with the final statement of Catholicism by Thomas Aquinas on one hand, and the logical culture of Germany on the other, the situation was not essentially a moral, or even a religious situation, but rather a logical. As has been stated before, if the *Summa Theologiæ* of Thomas had been immediately and widely accessible to the German people, it would have called forth the Reformation almost immediately. At least one can easily see how it might have done so. For the logical content of the Catholic dogma was apparent in Thomas' system, and the pure *a priori* assumption upon which it rested could but arouse the suspicion and criticism of a people who had learned the elements of logical thought.

Without affirming the Hegelian principle of history as a logical process, it may still be stated as an historical fact that the problem which the Reformers undertook to solve was not essentially an ethical problem nor a religious, though they were aware that the interests of ethical religion were profoundly served by the solution they gave to the problem. Is it supposed that they had not felt themselves justified by faith, or had not drawn hope and peace from the Scriptures prior to the discovery of these principles as the foundation of their reform? It was not a yearning for a goodness or an inspira-

tion not to be found in the Catholic Church which inspired their criticism of the church, for they could and did experience these before they broke from the church. What they sought primarily was a logically consistent statement of truth. What the church urged upon them as the only concept of value was a dogma that could not be broken up into any particular values. There was no place for the particular in the Catholic universal. The culture of their times and the training of their schools had taught them that the particular must be evaluated; that the universal which was of any utility or value in human affairs must be recognized as of value because deduced from the mass of valuable particulars; that *no* particular, worth the statement, could be deduced from any universal, assumed *a priori*; that the dogma of the Catholic Church, revealed in its complete form by Thomas Aquinas, was untrue to the very elements of human thinking, hence impossible of approbation by a truth-seeking people; that this dogma, held up to the light of logical analysis, was nothing but a piece of presumptive scholastic fiction, precisely on a par with the assumptions of logic with which the mediæval student amused himself and sharpened his wits.

It was clear to the logician of those days that the universal must always be combined with the particular in order to reach any practical and useful judgment whatever. The task of the Reformers was to supply the particular and state it in terms of the religious life. That they first undertook to do this *without* breaking with the church is proof that the situation was presented to them as a logical situation primarily, not that the church was an evil and spiritless institution against which they must revolt. Or, if the situation appealed to them *apparently* as an ethico-religious problem, yet the whole trend of their action shows that underneath the practical considerations of the Reformation was the simple demand that the Roman Church should be logically consistent in her statement of truth. There is, of course, the closest connection between logical consistency and practical ethics and religion; one reflects upon the other; either may be prior in expression and influence. The contention is, however, that if the practical considerations of good conduct and religious emotionalism had been the keynote of the Reformation, it would have taken an entirely different form, with no necessary resultant expression of principles such as were given by the Reformers. What is the logical content of those principles? Not, surely, an ethical code; but simply a particularism, in contradistinction to the

universalism of the Catholic dogma. Justification by faith can be taken as a moral code only by robbing it of the religious value which always attaches to faith. Inspiration of the Scriptures is no more an ethical statement than would be the affirmation of the inspiration of a sanctuary. Nor is justification by faith a religious affirmation primarily, but merely a *logical statement of the manner in which* a religious experience takes place. Similarly, inspiration of the Scriptures is primarily a statement of the place in which religious authority resides. The new thing, on which the Reformation rested, was not a discovery of "faith," or of "justification," or of "inspiration," but the discovery that the Catholic dogma gave no logical existence whatever to these experiences which were commonly possessed by believers, and that therefore the Catholic dogma was not a true statement of the content of the religious life, though within the Catholic Church a true religious life could be cultivated so long as it was content not to analyze itself in relation to the dogma of the church.

For the Reformation, therefore, there were needed three things:

(a) A deep religious and moral life within the church, of sufficient importance to call for inquiry and analysis as to its real content and meaning. Such were the lives of the Reformers, and such the basis of their interest while yet Roman Catholics.

(b) A logical statement of the real content of Catholic dogma. Such was given for the first time by Thomas Aquinas.

(c) Sufficient logical acumen on the part of the people to see the fallacy of the Roman dogma. Such was given to the Germanic people by Humanism and the Renaissance.

Given these three, the Reformation—non-Catholic religious freedom—was inevitable. Lacking any one of them, it would have been impossible. Inasmuch as the religious life was manifestly possible, and did exist, in the church, and in spite of the church, it is evident that the Reformation was primarily a logical reformation, the solution of a logical situation in the interests of consistency.

It has been shown (Chapters II, III) how the analysis of faith and reason by Thomas Aquinas gave to these, positively and by implication, the non-Catholic freedom which is characteristic of Protestantism. It has been shown (Chapters IV, V) that the Thomistic statement of the dogma "Church" was a necessary presupposition of the logical moment of the Reformation, and that this antedated the Reformation by three centuries only because the consciousness

of a naïve people required that time for an intellectual development sufficient to enable them to appropriate the reason and faith defined by Thomas, and by these instruments to solve the dogmatic problem which he set in clear and complete logical form. The logical grounds of the dissolution of Catholic dogma are completely given in the final, systematic statement of that dogma by the last and greatest of Catholic theologians.

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